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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20001085-CA 
vs. 
RENATO L. BARBOSA, Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for attempted kidnapping, a third degree 
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-301 (1983) and 76-4-101 (1973), 
in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Where defendant neither objected to the trial court's jury instructions nor 
proffered any instructions of his own, and where the record demonstrates that the 
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jury necessarily found each element of attempted kidnapping, did the trial court 
commit reversible error when it failed to instruct the jury on the elements of 
attempt? 
"This court reviews a trial court's failure to give accurate elements in a jury 
instruction under a correctness standard. However, jury instructions to which a 
party failed to object will not be reviewed absent manifest injustice." State v. 
Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted). 
2. Was the evidence so "inconclusive or inherently improbable" that 
"reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt" that defendant 
committed attempted kidnapping, and, if so, was the evidentiary defect "so obvious 
and fundamental" that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury? State 
v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 18, 10 P.3d 346. 
Review of defendant's unpreserved insufficiency claim is for plain error. See 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
included in Addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-301 (Kidnapping) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-101 (Attempt) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with attempted kidnapping and tried 
before a jury. R. 2-3. The jury found defendant guilty, and the court sentenced him 
to an indeterminate prison term not to exceed five years. R. 99, 102, 105. 
Defendant timely appealed. R. 111. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Crime 
Defendant, a thirty-year-old male driving his motorcycle on Logan Avenue in 
Salt Lake City, stopped fourteen-year-old Joshua Hansen, a stranger, to ask him the 
time. R. 12, 117:48-49, 55. When Joshua said he did not know, defendant asked 
Joshua whether he had a girlfriend, whether he had sex with his girlfriend, and how 
large his penis was. Id. at 49-51. Placing his two index fingers on his leg, 
defendant said that his own penis was "this big." Id. at 51. Defendant then asked 
Joshua to "[s]how me yours." Id. at 52. He also asked Joshua whether he had a lot 
of pubic hair and said "Show me that." Id. at 53. Joshua refused and repeatedly 
responded, "It doesn't matter, I gotta go." Id. at 51-53. Defendant also asked 
Joshua whether Joshua would like a ride home. Id. at 54. Joshua said, "No, I can 
walk." Id. 
At that point, defendant put down his kickstand, got off his motorcycle, put up 
his hand, and approached Joshua, asking Joshua to "measure hands" with him. Id. 
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at 53, 87. Joshua said, "No, I really got to go." Id. at 53. Defendant then reached 
down and grabbed Joshua's left arm between the elbow and the wrist and said 
"Come with me." Id. at 53-54, 90-94. Defendant began pulling Joshua toward 
him, and held Joshua from two to three seconds. Id. Joshua then twisted out of 
defendant's grasp and ran away. Id. at 54-58. Defendant did not follow. Id. at 95. 
Joshua's parents were driving in their neighborhood, saw Joshua running, and 
picked him up. Id. at 114-116. Joshua was upset and said he "was almost 
kidnapped." Id. at 116. Joshua's mother testified that she did not give defendant 
permission to take her son anywhere. Id. 
Kevin Jones, the investigating officer, testified that he prepared a report after 
talking to Joshua on the day of the incident. Id. at 100-101. The report included 
many of the details to which Joshua testified, but did not include the "come with 
me" statement. Id. at 108-111. Defendant's only witness, Detective David Jensen, 
who conducted two follow-up interviews with Joshua, reported additional details 
not included in Officer Jones's report, but apparently did not record a "come with 
me" statement either. Id. at 131-132. 
Jury Instruction 
After the conclusion of trial testimony, the court instructed the jury. 
Instruction 12, included in Addendum B, required the jury to find 
that defendant "attempted to detain or restrain Joshua," 
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• that the "attempted detention or restraint was done intentionally or knowingly," 
• that the attempted restraint was against Joshua's will and without lawful 
authority, and 
• that the "attempted detention or restraint was intended to be for a substantial 
period or was without the consent of [Joshua's] parent or guardian." 
R. 81. The trial court did not give an instruction on attempt. See R. 72-98. 
Defendant did not object to any instruction and did not proffer any further or 
different instructions. SeeR. 117:131-144. 
During closing arguments, both the prosecutor and defense counsel explained 
that an attempt requires "a substantial step." Id. at 151; 154. Defense counsel also 
explained that the "substantial steps [must be] strongly corroborative" of intent to 
commit a prohibited act. Id. at 154. 
Two theories were presented to the jury. The prosecution argued that 
defendant attempted to kidnap Joshua when he grabbed Joshua's arm. Id. at 151. 
Defense counsel argued that defendant was merely attempting to get Joshua to 
"measure hands" and that Joshua's "come with me" statement was a fabrication. 
Id. at 158-160. The jury, finding Joshua's story credible, returned a guilty verdict. 
Id. at 167. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Jury instructions adequately detailed the elements of attempted kidnapping. 
While the court did not specifically instruct the jury on the meaning of attempt, that 
failure did not mislead the jury or contribute to any unfavorable jury finding. On 
review, it is clear that the jury necessarily found all of the relevant elements and no 
manifest injustice occurred. Under the facts of this case, no reasonable likelihood 
exists that the jury would have returned a result more favorable to defendant had an 
attempt instruction been given. Failure to give the attempt instruction was not 
reversible error. 
2. The evidence sufficed to support the verdict. The trial produced evidence 
from which the jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, all the requisite elements of 
attempted kidnapping. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS TRIAL, 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS ADEQUATELY 
DETAILED THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE 
Defendant argues that the trial court's failure to include an elements 
instruction for attempt or to otherwise define attempt for the jury constituted plain 
error. Br. Aplt. at 10-11. Failure to give the attempt instruction did not prejudice 
defendant. It did not constitute "manifest injustice" and does not require reversal. 
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The State bears the burden of proving the elements of an offense. See State v. 
Hill, 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-501 (1973). 
The court must therefore properly instruct the jury on the elements the jury must 
find beyond a reasonable doubt. Manifest injustice may occur where, because no 
elements instruction is given or because the instruction given is incomplete or 
incorrect, the jury may reach a guilty verdict without finding each of the elements 
of the offense. See State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602, 608-609 (Utah App. 1998); 
State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1292 (Utah App. 1994) (noting that "manifest 
injustice" was obvious in State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059 (Utah 1991)). 
In other cases, however, the error may not be so substantial. While an 
instruction may be incomplete or incorrect, the reviewing court can determine that 
the jury did find each of the elements of the offense and therefore any error is not 
prejudicial. See State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048-1049 (Utah 1984) 
(reviewing failure to expressly treat element of knowledge in context of second 
degree murder conviction); Stevenson, 884 P.2d at 1292 (addressing absence of 
nonmarriage element in rape instruction). 
The distinction between errors that result in manifest injustice and those that 
do not is reflected in case law. Where a reviewing court cannot determine whether 
the jury found all the elements of the offense, reversal is required. This is 
obviously the case where a court completely fails to give an instruction regarding 
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the elements of the offense. See State v. Jones, 823 P.2d at 1061 (no instruction on 
aggravated kidnapping). Similarly, where the court fails to instruct regarding a 
crucial element of the offense, where that element is at issue, a reviewing court 
cannot determine whether the jury found that element and, again, reversal is 
required. See State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980) (no instruction on intent 
to permanently deprive owner). 
On the other hand, where the reviewing court can determine that the jury 
found all the elements of the offense, no prejudice—and therefore no manifest 
justice—has occurred. Even the failure to define a basic element of the offense 
does not always preclude a reviewing court's determination that the jury found all 
of the elements of the offense. If the element is not at issue, for instance, failure to 
instruct on that issue may not be prejudicial. In Stevenson this Court held that the 
trial court's failure to instruct on the nonmarriage element of rape, then an essential 
element of the offense, was nonprejudicial. See 884 P.2d at 1292. This Court 
observed that "the nonmarriage element of rape was never an issue at trial" and "all 
testimony at trial clearly and indisputably established that [the] defendant and [the 
victim] were not married." Id. 
Further, incomplete and incorrect elements instructions do not always require 
reversal. The failure to expressly instruct on the element of knowledge has been 
held harmless where 
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• the jury was not misled, 
• even had the instruction been given, the jury could not have avoided finding 
the required element, 
• no reasonable likelihood exists that a correct instruction may have produced a 
result more favorable to the defendant, and 
• defendant made no request for an instruction on the element. 
See Fontana, 680 P.2d at 1048-1049 (Utah 1984); cf. State v. Knowles, 709 P.2d 
311, 312 (Utah 1985) (holding that improper entrapment instruction did not warrant 
reversal because evidence of entrapment was sufficiently weak that, even absent 
error, defendant had no "reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result"). 
In the instant case, the failure to instruct on attempt was not prejudicial. No 
manifest injustice occurred, and the error does not require reversal. The jury was 
not misled. The jury could not have avoided finding the attempt element. 
Defendant did not object to the instructions or request an instruction on attempt, 
and no reasonable likelihood exists that the jury would have returned a more 
favorable verdict had a correct instruction been given. 
Defendant's cited cases are distinguishable. Here, the jury was instructed 
regarding the elements of kidnapping, but not regarding the elements of attempt. 
This case is therefore unlike Jones, where the trial court gave no instruction at all 
on aggravated kidnapping. See 823 P.2d at 1061. 
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This case also differs from Laine, where mens rea was a crucial element of the 
offense, and the reviewing court was unable to ascertain whether the jury found that 
Laine intended to permanently deprive the owner of his property. See 618 P.2d at 
35. In the instant case, the issue was not whether defendant "attempted" something. 
That was conceded. Defendant attempted something; and, in doing so, defendant 
grabbed Joshua's arm, maintaining the grasp until Joshua twisted away. 
R. 117:151, 158-160. The issue, rather, was what defendant attempted. 
Further, this case also differs from Laine because nothing in the Laine record 
suggested that the jury had found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
intended to permanently deprive the owner of his property. Here, the record 
demonstrates that the jury found the that defendant "attempted" the crime, i.e., that 
he committed a "substantial step" "strongly corroborative" of his intent to kidnap. 
Only two theories of the evidence were presented here: the prosecution's 
theory that defendant grabbed Joshua's arm in an attempt to kidnap and defendant's 
theory that he grabbed Joshua's arm in an attempt to "measure hands." The jury 
rejected defendant's theory when it found defendant guilty. It necessarily found the 
uncontested fact that defendant grabbed Joshua's arm and held him a few seconds. 
The jury also drew from the facts the reasonable inference that this act was an 
attempt to kidnap, not an attempt to measure hands, and credited Joshua's story that 
defendant said, "Come with me." 
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The Utah kidnapping statute states that "[a] person commits kidnapping when 
he intentionally or knowingly and without authority of law and against the will of 
the victim" does one of the following acts: 
• "detains or restrains another for any substantial period," or 
• "detains or restrains another in circumstances exposing him to risk of serious 
bodily injury," or 
• "holds another in involuntary servitude," or 
• "detains or restrains a minor without consent of its parent or guardian'' 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-301 (1983) (emphasis added). The jury was instructed on 
these elements. R. 82. The prosecution did not argue that defendant held or 
attempted to hold Joshua for a substantial period, exposed or attempted to expose 
him to risk of serious bodily injury, or held or attempted to hold him in involuntary 
servitude. The prosecution argued only that defendant detained or restrained or 
attempted to detain or restrain Joshua, a minor, without consent of his parent. The 
elements instruction given to the jury reflected this theory. See R. 81. 
In some cases, an act may be a step toward the commission of an offense but 
not a "substantial step" or not "strongly corroborative" of the intent to commit the 
offense. In the context of this case and under the kidnapping law applicable to its 
facts, defendant's act was necessarily a "substantial step" and "strongly 
corroborative" of the intent to commit kidnapping. If defendant grabbed Joshua's 
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arm even momentarily, he not only attempted, but completed, the crime of 
kidnapping. All the law requires is that the restraint or detention of a minor, 
however brief, be without his parent's consent. If the jury found that defendant 
grabbed Joshua's arm, a fact that it necessarily found under the instructions as 
given, the jury found the elements of kidnapping. If the jury found the elements of 
kidnapping, a fortiori the jury found the elements of attempted kidnapping, 
including a "substantial step" that was "strongly corroborative" of defendant's 
intent to commit kidnapping.1 
In other words, not only was the element of attempt not at issue, but even had 
it been, this jury was not misled. Even had the attempt instruction been given, the 
jury could not have avoided finding that defendant attempted to kidnap Joshua. 
Under the facts presented and the applicable law, no reasonable likelihood exists 
that a correct instruction would have produced a result more favorable to the 
defendant. 
Defendant argues, nonetheless, that State v. Harmon, 712 P.2d 291 (Utah 
1986), controls this case and that the failure to give an attempt instruction requires 
reversal, thus precluding analysis of other precedent. The Harmon court did find 
the refusal to give an attempt instruction reversible error and reversed a conviction 
for attempted robbery. The Harmon decision, however, clearly rested on a failure 
1
 Further, the actual commission of an offense is not a defense to the offense of 
attempt. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-101(3)(a). 
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to give an attempt instruction in the face of an objection to the instruction given and 
the proffer of an instruction on attempt. Id. In the instant case, no objection was 
made and no alternative instruction was proffered, and Harmon does not control. 
Further, the Harmon court stated that it was "unable to determine whether the 
jury properly found each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 
292. Here, as explained in the foregoing analysis, this Court can determine that the 
jury necessarily found each and every element. Where the jury could not have 
avoided finding the element of attempt, "in company with the fact that the defense 
made no request for an instruction," error in omission of the instruction is not 
prejudicial and does not require reversal. Fontana, 680 AP.2d at 1048.2 
In sum, although the trial court erred when it failed to give an attempt 
instruction, the error did not constitute a complete failure to instruct on the elements 
of attempted kidnapping. Further, the element of attempt was not at issue in this 
case. Even had it been, the record demonstrates that the jury necessarily found 
2In Harmon, the State faulted defendant for not providing a full trial transcript on 
appeal, speculating that the full transcript may have demonstrated that the error was 
harmless. 719 P.2d at 292. The court found that the record provided was sufficient to 
establish the error claimed. Id. That record demonstrated (1) defendant's objection and 
proffered jury instruction and (2) the judge's stated reasons for refusing the instruction. 
Id. The court did not have before it a record demonstrating that the jury had found each 
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Had the State supplemented the record 
and had the record demonstrated that the jury had found each element of the offense, the 
Harmon court may have reached a different result, even though an objection had been 
made. Harmon could be read to shift the burden to the State to show harmlessness where 
the trial court errs in an elements instruction and the defendant objects, thereby preserving 
the claim. 
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every element of attempted kidnapping. In view of the nature and quantity of the 
evidence in this case, no reasonable likelihood exists that a correct instruction 
would have produced a result more favorable to defendant. Defendant did not 
object, and no manifest injustice occurred. The error was nonprejudicial and does 
not require reversal. No precedent compels a different result.3 
Point II 
EVIDENCE SUFFICED TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT 
Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient, as a matter of law, to 
sustain the jury's guilty verdict. Br. Aplt. at 15-17. Specifically, defendant argues 
that his "grabbing Joshua's arm for two seconds and telling him 'Come with me' 
and then letting him go without any threat or harm when Joshua pulled away did 
not constitute a substantial step which was strongly corroborative of intent to 
kidnap." Id. at 17. Defendant "relies on the plain error and ineffective assistance 
of counsel doctrines in addressing [these] matters for the first time on appeal." Id. 
at 18. 
Defendant establishes no error. His reliance on plain error and ineffective 
assistance of counsel is therefore unavailing. 
3Defendant also relies on the "ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine[]" to raise 
this unpreserved issue on appeal. See Br. Aplt at 1-2,1 n.2. Because any error was not 
prejudicial, defendant cannot meet the second prong of the test set forth in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). See Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521-522 
(Utah 1994). 
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To establish error, defendant must show that the evidence was "sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable" that "reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt" that defendant committed attempted kidnapping. 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74,118 (internal quotation marks omitted). Put another way, 
"[s]o long as there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which 
findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made," this 
Court will not reverse. State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, f67, 425 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
Here, evidence adduced was sufficient on every element of the crime. 
Evidence was adduced at trial that defendant intentionally and knowingly, without 
authority of law, and without Joshua's consent, grabbed Joshua's arm and held it 
for a few seconds. R. 117: 53-54, 90-94. Evidence was presented that Joshua was 
a minor and that defendant did not have Joshua's parents' permission to grab and 
detain Joshua. Id. at 55, 116. Any detention of a minor, under these circumstances, 
is sufficient to support a conviction for kidnapping. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-
301. It is necessarily sufficient to support a conviction for attempted kidnapping. 
See State v. Garnick, 619 P.2d, 1383, 1385 (1980). Grabbing and holding Joshua, 
however momentarily, was an act sufficient to constitute a "substantial step" 
"strongly corroborative" of defendant's intent to kidnap. 
15 
The jury also credited Joshua's statement that defendant said "Come with me." 
That statement provides additional, although unnecessary, support for the jury's 
verdict. The statement and act together even more forcibly demonstrate both an 
actual kidnapping and the included "substantial step" "strongly corroborative" of 
the attempt to kidnap. 
Evidence sufficed to support jury findings on all the requisite elements of 
attempted kidnapping, and the trial court did not err in submitting the case to the 
jury. Because defendant cannot show error, he cannot demonstrate plain error. He 
cannot show any evidentiary defect let alone a defect "so obvious and fundamental" 
that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, at 
f 18. Because the evidence is legally sufficient, defendant's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim also necessarily fails. See State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, f34, 989 
P.2d 52 ("failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile if 
raised does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel"). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on August /_, 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General h 
f JEANNE B. INOUYE 
I ^Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM "A" 
1 
PART 3 
KIDNAPING 
76-5-301. Kidnaping. 
(1) A person commits kidnaping when he intentionally or knowingly and without authority 
of law and against the will of the victim: 
(a) detains or restrains another for any substantial period; or 
(b) detains or restrains another in circumstances exposing him to risk of serious bodily injury; 
or 
(c) holds another in involuntary servitude; or 
(d) detains or restrains a minor without consent of its parent or guardian. 
(2) Kidnaping is a felony of the second degree. 
History: C. 1953,76-5-301, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-301; 1983, ch. 88, § 13. 
© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the Lexis-Nexis® Group. All rights reserved. 
1 
PARTI 
ATTEMPT 
76 4 101 Attempt - Elements of offense. 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with 
the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the offense, he engages in 
conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step unless it is 
strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise: 
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or 
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been committed had the 
attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them to be. 
Hisl « >i } i C, 1953, 76- 4 101 < snacti M:I I >> I • 19" 73, ch 196, § 76 4 101 
© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the Lexis-Nexis^ Group. All rights reserved. 
ADDENDUM "B" 
INSTRUCTION NO. \1^ 
Before you can convict the defendant, RENATO LEITE BARBOSA, 
of the offense of Attempt Kidnapping as charged in tne 
information, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of 
that offense: 
1. That on or about the 31st day of May, 2000, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, RENATO LEITE BARBOSA, 
attempted to detain or restrain JOSHUA HANSEN; and 
2. That such attempted detention or restraint was done 
intentionally or knowingly; and 
3. That such attempted detention or restraint was against 
the will of JOSHUA HANSEN, and without authority of law; and 
4. That such attempted detention or restraint was 
intended to be for a substantial period or was without the 
consent of JOSHUA Hansen's parent or guardian. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Attempted Kidnapping as 
charged in the information. If, on the other hand, you are not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the 
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. \3 
Under the law of the State of Utah a person commits the 
crime of Kidnapping when that person intentionally or knowingly 
and without authority of law and against the will of the victim: 
a) detains or restrains another for any substantial 
period; or 
b) detains or restrains another in circumstances exposing 
that other person to risk of serious bodily injury; or 
c) hold another in involuntary servitude; or 
d) detains or restrains a minor without consent of that 
minor's parent or guardian. 
INSTRUCTION NO. \A 
The intent with which an act is done denotes a state of 
mind and connotes a purpose in so acting. Intent, being a state 
of mind, is seldom susceptible of proof by direct and positive 
evidence and may ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, 
statements and circumstances. 
INSTRUCTION NO. \^> 
Intent and motive should never be confused. Motive is what 
prompts a person to act, or fail to act. Intent refers only to 
the state of mind with which an act is done or omitted. 
Motive is not an element of any offense, and hence need not 
be proven. The motive of an accused is immaterial except 
insofar as evidence of motive may aid in your determination of 
state of mind or intent. 
INSTRUCTION NO. \ ig 
You are instructed that a person engages in conduct: 
Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to 
the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it 
is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or 
cause the result. 
Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct 
or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of 
the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. A 
person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a 
result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is 
reasonably certain to cause the result. 
INSTRUCTION NO. \r{ 
To constitute the crime charged in the information tnere 
must be the joint operation of two essential elements: conduct 
prohibited by law and the appropriate culpable mental state or 
states with regard to the conduct prohibited by law. 
Before a defendant may be found guilty of a crime, the 
evidence must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
was prohibited from committing the conduct charged in the 
information and that the defendant committed such conduct with 
the culpable mental state required for such offense. 
"Conduct" means an act or omission. 
"Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes 
speech. 
"Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal 
duty to act and the actor is capable of acting. 
INSTRUCTION NO. \% 
The definition of "restrain" is to limit, confine, abridge, 
narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, and hinder, to prohibit 
from action, to restrict a person's movements in such manner as 
to interfere substantially with his/her liberty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. \C\ 
The definition of "detain" is to retain as the possession 
of personalty, to delay, to hinder, to hold, or keep in custody, 
to retard, to restrain from proceeding, to stay, to stop, to 
withhold. 
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1 i A And he was like do you got a lot of hair down there? | 
2 i And I was like "It doesn't matter. I really got to go." And j 
3 ! he was like, "Well, show me that." And I was like, "No." And 
i 
4 | then he's like, he put the kick stand down on his bike and he 
5 put up his hand and he's like measure hands. 
6 | Q So, just a second. You said he put the kick stand 
7 I down on his bike. He asked you all of these questions from his 
8 motorcycle? 
9 A Yeah. 
10 Q Okay. And he put the kick stand down and showed you 
11 the palm of his hand? 
12 A Yeah. 
13 Q And then what happened? 
14 A And he was like measure hands with me and I was like 
15 no, I really got to go. And then he approached me and he 
16 grabbed my left arm on my forearm part. 
17 Q Uh-huh (affirmative). 
18 I A Right here and I just twisted around. 
19 ( Q Could you show the jury with your own arm where 
20 | exactly he grabbed your left arm? 
21 i A Right here. 
22 j MR. COPE: Indicating approximately one-third of the 
23 way down from the elbow to the wrist, your Honor - or two 
24 thirds of the way. 
25 THE COURT: Very well. 
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I 
1 I Q (BY MR. COPE) How long did he have you hand or his 
2 hand on your arm like that? 
A I'd say anywhere from two to three seconds. 
Q And what stopped it from being on there? What got it 
off? 
A I just twisted away and ran. 
Q You twisted away and ran? 
A Yeah. 
Q And did you hear anything behind you? Did you hear 
him calling or saying anything to you? 
A Only when he grabbed me. He was like "Come with me." 
But he didn't say nothing after that that I can remember? 
Q Did he ever ask you about having a ride home? 
A Yeah. Yeah, he did. 
Q What did he say? 
A He said it before. He said it when, after he asked 
me, after he asked me to show me my pee-pee and I was like I 
really got to go. And he's like, "Well, do you want a ride 
home?" 
Q Okay. Did you indicate that you wanted a ride home? 
A No. 
Q Did you say that you didn't want a ride home? 
A Yeah. I was like, no, I can walk. 
Q Did he ever ask you how old you were? 
A Yeah. 
54 
MR. CORRY: We'd move to admit Defendant's 6, Judge. 
MR. COPE: No objection. 
THE COURT: Received. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 6 received) 
Q (BY MR. CORRY) He asked you to measure hands. Now, 
I'm a little bit confused about this. Did you understand what 
that meant? 
A Yeah. 
Q What did it mean? 
A It just meant put hand and hand and see if it, I 
thought it just meant put hand to hand and see whose hand is 
bigger? 
Q See whose hand is bigger? 
A Yeah. 
Q You said before you and your friends did that to see 
who could palm a basketball that, right? 
A Yeah, we always do that. 
Q Okay. So, that's what you thought he was basically 
doing just seeing whose hand was bigger, right? 
A Yeah. 
Q He walks up to you, like this with his hand out? 
A Yeah. 
Q Okay. And you say, no, I don't want to measure your 
hand. 
A I was like, no, I gotta go. 
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right? 
A 
Okay. And then he reaches down, right? 
Yeah, 
With his other hand. 
No, it was the same. 
The same hand, reaches down, grabs your hand, right? 
Grabbed mine. 
Your forearm, right here (inaudible). 
Yeah. 
Is that right? 
Hold my forearm. 
Okay. 
A little tiny bit above my -
Half way up? Is that right? 
Yeah. 
Okay. And began to pull it up, correct? 
No, he was just pulling it towards him. 
Yeah, like this, right? 
Yeah. 
Okay. And at that point you were scared? 
Well, yeah. 
Right? 
Yeah. 
The questions before probably made you nervous, 
Yeah. 
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1 i Q And so now this made you real nervous? 
2 A Yeah. 
3 ! Q Right? So, as soon as he grabbed your hand you said 
i 
4 I to yourself, I'm getting out of here. 
5 I A I'd just -
6 I Q Right? 
7 I A Yeah. 
8 1 Q So you just twisted your arm. 
9 J A He just, yeah. 
i 
10 I Q And you took off. 
11 A Yeah. 
12 Q Okay. And you kept running all the way to 17th 
13 South? 
14 A Yeah. 
15 Q Is that right? 
16 I A Yeah. 
17 I Q Did you look back at all? 
18 J A Yeah. 
i 
19 J Q Okay. What did you see when you looked back, Josh? 
20 | A I just seen him stand there for a second and then he 
21 I just turned around and ran towards his motorcycle. 
22 Q Okay. So, he stood. 
23 A Yeah, and we just waited for a second or two. And 
24 turned and ran towards his motorcycle. 
25 i Q Okay. He stood? 
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A Yeah, he just stood like I was (inaudible) with you 
and just turned around towards his motorcycle. 
Q How far away were you when that happened? How far 
down the street were you? 
i 
A I'd say a good anywhere from fifteen to twenty feet. 
Q Were you down by (inaudible) by then? 
A I was probably back there, probably at their 
driveway. 
Q (inaudible). 
A No, just before the driveway. 
Q Okay. So, you're past the two houses? , 
A Yeah. , 
Q Okay. All right. That's when he turns and I 
skedaddles toward his motorcycle. i 
A Yeah. I 
Q Is that right? I 
A Yeah. I 
Q Okay. Okay, Josh, we'll use a different color, okay? I 
This is State's Exhibit 1, we'll use blue ink, okay? If you , 
could just show the jury, draw on here with a blue pen where , 
you were when you saw him turn and skedaddle back towards the , 
motorcycle. 
A (Witness complies). 
Q Okay. And then he rides off. , 
A Yeah. 
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Q Right? And you kept going? 
A Yeah. 
Q You never stopped the whole time? 
A Not that I can remember. 
Q Okay. You got to the intersection, right? 
A At 17th South. 
Q Okay. Now there is something I forgot, Josh, I do 
this sometimes and I apologize. It's something that's 
important, okay? So, let me go back to it. This is right when 
he grabs you by the arm. 
A What is? 
Q When he reaches out and he grabs your forearm. 
A Yeah. 
Q And tugs on it? 
A Yeah. 
Q Okay? And you indicate that he said come with me. 
A Yeah. 
Q Was it, was that the words? 
A Yeah. 
Q Okay. Now this is important, Josh. Did you tell 
that to the policeman who came there that night? 
A Yeah, I did. 
Q You're sure? 
A Yeah. 
Q Okay. Did you tell that to the detectives that you 
93 
talked to later? 
A I'm not sure if I told it to the detectives. 
Q It was a long time after. Right? 
A Yeah. A week after. 
Q Okay. All right. So then you got to the corner. 
A Yeah. 
Q And you started down the street. 
A Yeah. 
Q Okay. And one more thing that's just to clarify -
And I'm sorry, Judge. 
At the time that he said come with me. I just want 
to have, make this is clear in my head, okay? I sometimes have 
a hard time figuring out what's going on. It was right when he 
was holding up his hand and he reached right down to your arm. 
Is that right? 
A Yeah. 
Q Okay. And then he said come with me? 
A I didn't understand that question. 
Q He said it right as he touched your hand? Do you 
remember? It's okay if you don't. 
A Just barely after he got a grasp on it or barely, 
yeah, I'll say right when he touched my arm. 
Q Okay. So, it was probably, you were twisting away as 
he was saying it? 
A Yeah. 
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Q Okay. He never followed you, isn't that right? 
A No. 
Q Okay. And then you went down 17th South. 
A Yeah. 
Q Down by 5th East and met up with your parents. 
A Yeah. 
Q Right? Okay. Did you see him again in that time? 
A No. 
Q Did a motorcycle go past you? 
A No. 
Q Okay. Were you looking around for him? 
A No. 
Q You were just focused straight ahead? 
A Yeah. 
Q Okay. You weren't concerned that he might be coming 
behind you? 
A I wasn't really thinking about that. 
Q You weren't? 
A I was just thinking just get somewhere safe. 
Q You were just thinking I'm going home. 
A Yeah. 
Q Okay. 
MR. CORRY: Judge, if I could just have one second. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
Q (BY MR. CORRY) Now, Josh, you weren't bruised from 
